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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

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14 Pages : 154-161

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/ger.2020(V-III).14      10.31703/ger.2020(V-III).14      Published : Sep 2020

An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan

Abstract

    This study aims to examine the association between firm performance and ownership structure. We collect the data from the annual reports of 60 random firms, which are listed in the Karachi stock exchange (KSE 100 Index), for a period of 5 years from 2007-2011. Firm performance is measured by using market and accounting based proxies, Tobin's Q, ROA, and ROE, respectively, while ownership structure is measured as a percentage of shares held by the Board of Directors. The findings reveal that ownership structure has a negative and significant association with firm performance (accounting-based proxy).

    Ownership Structure, ROA, ROE, Leverage

    (1) Ghulam Nabi
    Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration, University of Kotli, AJ&K, Pakistan.
    (2) Faheem Ghaznafar
    Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration, University of Kotli, AJ&K, Pakistan.
    (3) Tahira Asif
    MS Scholar, Department of Management Sciences, The Agriculture University Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
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Cite this article

APA

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Nabi, Ghulam, Faheem Ghaznafar, and Tahira Asif. 2020. "An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan." Global Economics Review, V (III): 154-161 doi: 10.31703/ger.2020(V-III).14

HARVARD

    HARVARD : NABI, G., GHAZNAFAR, F. & ASIF, T. 2020. An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan. Global Economics Review, V, 154-161.

MHRA

    MHRA : Nabi, Ghulam, Faheem Ghaznafar, and Tahira Asif. 2020. "An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan." Global Economics Review, V: 154-161

MLA

    MLA : Nabi, Ghulam, Faheem Ghaznafar, and Tahira Asif. "An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan." Global Economics Review, V.III (2020): 154-161 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Nabi, Ghulam, Ghaznafar, Faheem, and Asif, Tahira (2020), "An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan", Global Economics Review, V (III), 154-161

TURABIAN

    TURABIAN : Nabi, Ghulam, Faheem Ghaznafar, and Tahira Asif. "An Empirical Investigation on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Pakistan." Global Economics Review V, no. III (2020): 154-161. https://doi.org/10.31703/ger.2020(V-III).14